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Equal consideration of all – an aporetic project?  
 
Abstract: The article considers the relationships among three arguments  
that purport to establish the intrinsically contradictory or paradoxical  
nature of the modern project aiming at the equal consideration of all. The  
claim that the inevitable historical insertion of universal-egalitarian norms  
leads to always particular and untransparent interpretations of grammatically  
universal norms may be combined with the claim that the logic of  
determination of political communities tends to generate exclusions. The  
combination of these two claims lends specific force to the third argument  
according to which equal consideration perpetually requires the non- 
egalitarian project of understanding (excluded) individuals on their own  
terms. Hence, taking off from a recent debate between Christoph Menke  
and Jürgen Habermas, I argue that the former is right to diagnose an  
aporetic self-reflection in egalitarian universalism, while agreeing with the  
latter about the indispensability of deliberative democratic frameworks for  
the defence of both egalitarian and non-egalitarian norms.  
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The current appeal of deliberative democracy may be explained by its  
perceived ability to address political and sociological issues confronting  
contemporary democratic societies and by its normative advance over  
older theories of liberal democracy. It promises to criticize a neo-liberal  
political and economic agenda while remaining realistic about the possibilities  
of democratization in highly complex societies. Deliberative  
democracy also seems to be able to solve the old problem of harmonizing  
popular sovereignty and liberal rights, as well as offering a conception  
of egalitarian universalism that is as inclusive as possible, that is,  
that embodies a high degree of toleration in the face of modern  
pluralisms, including those of value and those of interests. Lastly, it 
overcomes an older theory’s emphasis on the mere aggregation of interests  
and preferences by focusing on pre-voting deliberation geared toward a  
consensus that may lay claim to being presumptively more just and  
rational: more just, because it does not conceive toleration so as to  
permit (retrospectively established) majorities to blatantly disregard  
minorities, and more rational, in that subjective preferences are subject  
to discursive revision.1  
 
It can do all these things at once, it is claimed, by making legitimate  
decisions depend upon a process of public deliberation whose necessary  
procedural constraints (largely) include those subjective rights of equal  
autonomy that modern societies came to accept as a result of their  
growing pluralism and secularization (Habermas, 1996, ch. 3). This  
unity of liberalism and democracy, or of private and public autonomy,  
is also claimed to be a response to a ‘post-metaphysical’ situation in  
which fundamental values must be ‘political, not metaphysical’, that is,  
in which comprehensive views of the good life may not become the basis  
of legitimate conceptions of democratic equality. Thus, equal subjective  
rights enjoy a certain fundamental priority vis-à-vis other political and  
moral values insofar as they can be grounded on the basis of allegedly  
non-comprehensive, impartial (neutral) procedures that specify the  
moral point of view, such as the conception of an ideal discourse situation  
or an original position. While fundamental liberal rights are thus  
removed from criticism insofar as any such publicly asserted criticism  
and deliberation must already presuppose them, the further institutionalization,  
interpretation, application and enforcement of rights to equal  
consideration is subject to public deliberation. Such deliberation still  
prioritizes (moral) questions of justice (and thus of equality) over  
(ethical) questions of the good life and corresponding comprehensive  
doctrines in order to make rational consensus possible.  
 
Despite the apparent appeal of deliberative democracy, its egalitarian  
universalism remains subject to critiques that, given that they  
proceed from the same normative and/or sociological background, it  
cannot afford to dismiss. Here, I will consider three arguments that,  
while friendly to egalitarian universalism, purport to show the intrinsically  
aporetic character of the equal consideration of all. The claim that  
the inevitable historical insertion of universal-egalitarian norms leads to  
always particular and untransparent interpretations of grammatically  
universal norms may be combined with the claim that the logic of determination  
of political communities tends to generate exclusions. As I will  
attempt to show, the combination of these two claims lends specific force  
to the third argument according to which equal consideration perpetually  
requires the non-egalitarian project of understanding individuals on  
their own terms. Hence, taking off from a recent debate between  
Christoph Menke and Jürgen Habermas, I argue that the former is right  
to diagnose an aporetic self-reflection in egalitarian universalism, while  
agreeing with the latter about the indispensability of deliberative democratic  
frameworks for the defence of both egalitarian and non-egalitarian  
norms. In order to make my case, I will seek to expand Menke’s arguments  
by way of an immanent reading of Habermas’ moral and political  
work, a reading that, I hope, is critical but generous.  
 
Let me begin by summarizing, in the first section (I), the arguments  
Menke, on behalf of Adorno’s ‘non-identical’ and Derrida’s ‘singularity’,  
has presented against the egalitarian universalism of a Habermasian  
or Rawlsian kind. I will then show (II) how Habermas defends the  
normative ideal of deliberative democracy against aporetic conclusions,  
in order then to intervene more fully in the debate. I will argue first (in  
section III) that the inevitable institutionalization of universal norms in  
particular historically grown institutions, which Habermas recognizes,  
creates tendencies toward exclusions from grammatically universal and  
inclusive norms. In a second step (IV), I will combine the argument from  
inevitable particularization with the hermeneutic argument about the  
influence of unreflected background in deliberation. In the following  
section (V), I will take up in greater detail a third argument that is to  
establish the aporetic self-reflection of egalitarian universalism: the  
claim that understanding individuals and describing equal persons  
reciprocally require, and yet limit and transcend, one another. I will  
confront this claim with the assumption that communicative, deliberative  
practices can accomplish both projects without contradiction, and  
argue, in the final section (VI), that especially in situations of exclusions,  




In the critique of egalitarianism in general and Rawls in particular,  
Menke’s overall point is that the peculiarly self-reflective character of  
modern ethics takes two forms that are not simply to be opposed to one  
another, as is usually done, but stand in a ‘negatively dialectical’  
(Adorno) or ‘aporetic’ (Derrida) relation of mutual presupposition and  
reciprocal limitation: the forms of justifying the overarching norm of  
equality and of criticizing it from the perspective of individuality. The  
idea of equal respect for, and consideration of, all persons, perpetually  
requires, but is also limited by, the attempt to do justice to singularity,  
that of ‘beings’ and that of situations. Modern egalitarianism is characterized  
by the double claim that, first, equality is fundamental in that it  
is not itself grounded in, and thus limited by, other norms, but rather  
grounds and conditions all others. And, secondly, equality enjoys priority  
over non-egalitarian norms of singularity, such as solidarity, loyalty,  
friendship, love, pity, compassion, care, and so forth. According to  
Menke, this double claim to a fundamental priority of equality in  
relation to other, non-egalitarian values is mistaken and potentially self- 
defeating (Menke, 2000: 6f.). The claim as to equality’s foundational  
status cannot be established without an infinite regress or a vicious  
circle, as what is to be justified in its foundational status – the notion  
of equality – is usually already presupposed in the very concept of  
normative justification (Menke, 2000: 9, 36ff.).2 Instead of this circular  
process, we should conceive equality’s ground to lie in its relation to  
norms of singularity, whose very insufficiency calls forth equal treatment:  
‘The principle of equality is right because (and insofar as) it leads  
to the determination of modes of action or regulations, which are good  
in the sense of taking into account the complaints of individuals’  
(Menke, 2000: 37).3 This already indicates that equality is here to lose  
its priority over other norms: the claim as to its priority neglects that  
equality, understood as the equal consideration of all, must engage in  
the non-egalitarian project of seeking to understand others on their own  
terms in order to achieve its aim. The idea of equality must then remain  
exposed to those values of singularity that it nonetheless implies, and  
not only in the application, but already in the necessary but perpetual  
re-formulation of equal justice (Menke, 2000: 20ff.).4  
 
For instance, the concept of a person that is required by the practice of  
equality must be continuously redefined on the basis of, and in relation to,  
the self-understanding of individuals. Political, liberal neutrality may not  
mean mere abstraction and independence from individual (ethical) conceptions  
of selfhood and the good life. As can be seen from the history of determinations  
of persons as bearers of equal rights, these determinations always  
excluded some individuals, such as those without Christian faith, the 
economically underprivileged, women, non-European races, and so on. Apart  
from appealing to nakedly strategic interests, these exclusionary results can  
be explained in two ways, a ‘hermeneutic’ and a ‘conceptual’ one. The  
hermeneutic argument insists on what Gadamer, somewhat polemically,  
called ‘prejudices’ (Menke, 2000: 20). Such preconceptions derive from our  
inevitable and perpetual situatedness in history and influence the way we  
fill central notions such as those of the ‘person’ with content. Since we are  
today in a situation that is not different in principle from that of our 
prejudiced ancestors, we too must continuously seek to expose our prejudgments  
in the effort to revise and reformulate fundamental political categories  
(which are thus ‘essentially contested concepts’). It is this exposure and  
working-through that cannot do without the attempt to understand individuals  
and newly emerging group identities on their own terms.  
 
The exclusions may, however, also be understood less as a result of  
what Heidegger called the historicity of our understanding, and more  
as a result of a conceptual logic: since these political categories need to  
be determined, and determination requires the distinguishing reference  
to that which they are not, they must of necessity exclude. Equal  
consideration needs to delimit the world-views as well as the beings to  
be considered equal. For example, in Rawls’ political liberalism, unreasonable  
comprehensive doctrines as well as people unable to cooperate  
over time are totally or partially excluded, as Menke reminds  
us (Menke, 2002: 900).5 While such exclusions are necessary, they may  
not be ‘naturalized’ (Mouffe, 2000: 49), or, as Menke charges political  
liberalism, ‘ignored’ (Menke, 2002: 905; see also Connolly, 1999: 10f.,  
62ff.). Hence, political liberalism must flag its contestability and  
‘practice an attitude, a virtue, which is not exhausted by the equal  
consideration of all’ but rather ‘limits and transcends’ it from the  
perspective of the individual lives who suffer from exclusions (Menke,  
2002: 903).  
 
As a result of the inherently aporetic nature of equality, justice  
remains ‘to come’ in Derrida’s sense of an open-ended historicity  
(Derrida, 1992; Fritsch, 2002). Political neutrality, as well as universality,  
as Menke and Laclau agree, remains an ‘empty place’ (Menke, 2002:  
902; Laclau et al., 2000: 58) that equality must seek to fill, but is 




Let us now turn to Habermas’ response to Menke.6 Habermas reads  
Menke’s interrogation of equality as a ‘postmodern’ critique of reason  
in its attempt to identify a self-contradiction, a paradox, in the idea of  
equality and its relation to individuals. Habermas’ defence of the nonaporetical  
(and hence, in Habermas’ terms, rational) idea of impartial  
equality essentially revolves around three claims. First, he claims that  
no conceptual argument (on the basis of which Menke identified the  
necessity of exclusions in the determination of equality), but only  
empirical investigations, can explain historical exclusions, such as those  
of women, non-property holders, blacks, indios, the disabled, and so  
on. Particularist usurpations of the universal display an ‘incomplete  
differentiation between the right and the good’ but do not prove the  
paradoxical, and hence in principle interminable, nature of the liberal- 
democratic project in general (Habermas, 2003: 376f.). Instead, this  
project may still be conceived as an ongoing, single historical ‘learning  
process’ that corrects such particularist readings over time. Secondly,  
Habermas reasserts the priority of equality, this time not in a normative  
but a functionalist manner, by arguing that the ideas of equality and  
of individual concern cannot have an equal status when it comes to the  
legal and the political sphere. An ethics of care, for instance, cannot be  
legally and politically institutionalized since morality and law serve  
different functions in highly complex modern societies.7 Contrary to  
morality, law has a disburdening function in regard to the motivational  
and cognitive demands on individuals who are free to choose their  
conception of the good life: to stabilize behavioural expectations and  
achieve social order, legally enforced demands must be reciprocal. In  
addition to this sociological point, Habermas argues that legal obligations  
remain restricted to the form of legal norms, according to which  
all institutionalizable expectations are reciprocal (Habermas, 2003:  
373).  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, Habermas brings in a specifically  
deliberative understanding of democratic legitimacy to counter the  
charges on behalf of singular others. Given a legislative process in which  
private and public autonomy complement one another, Habermas  
argues, singular individuals have already had the chance to articulate  
their views in the deliberative process. Hence, laws that specify and  
apply constitutional guarantees of equal consideration do not confront  
them as alien impositions that inevitably do violence to their self- 
understanding and their ideas of the good life. Insofar as the standpoint  
of impartial equality, understood as an inclusive deliberative process,  
includes the voices of individuals, it cannot be opposed to the perspective  
of singular others. So Habermas agrees with Menke’s insistence on  
the need to perpetually redefine central notions, such as that of the  
‘equal person’, in light of the complaints of the excluded. However,  
Habermas argues that this perpetual redefinition is best accomplished  
in the egalitarian framework of a deliberative opinion formation. The  
discursively procedural and legally institutionalized scaffolding of this  
framework consists in norms of universal equality on which any claim  
to inclusion on the part of the excluded must always already draw.  
 
A further elaboration of the basic thrust of this third response is the  
claim that the recognition of, say, cultural differences in the public  
sphere requires a deep-seated change of mentalities that cannot be  
enforced by law, but that can be indirectly promoted by it, precisely  
through the egalitarian constitutional and institutional protection of a  
public sphere in which communicative action, and hence mutual  
perspective-taking, flourishes. If we adopt a deliberative conception of  
impartial and equal consideration (as opposed to the aggregative  
conception of classical liberalism), the perspective of individuals as  
singular others cannot be opposed to it, as it (at least ideally) has already  
entered into it. Habermas writes:  
 
He who takes into view only the semantic properties of a universal norm  
and then claims that they cannot do justice to the particularity of a case and  
to the individual context of a life history, overlooks the pragmatic meaning  
of the ‘universality’ of democratically justified norms. These kinds of norms  
have been discovered and adopted after a deliberative and decision-making  
process which justifies the presumption of rational, and in this sense  
universal acceptability.... Like classical liberalism, postmodern liberalism  
shuts out, along with the legislative process, the democratic component from  
the guiding idea of equal freedom and neglects the dialectical relation  
between private and civic autonomy. (Habermas, 2003: 379)  
 
Thus, by neglecting the deliberative input into the legislative process,  
Menke does not register that individuals participate in the construction  
of the impartial viewpoint that is to guarantee equal consideration. Its  
potentially asymmetrical and non-neutral consequences for individuals  
who affirm different visions of the good life are then not an indication  
of the aporetic character of civic equality in its relation to individuals,  
but an expression of the very principle of equality. Rather than locating  
contradictions within the norm of equality, which may lead to a ‘disarming  
ontologization’ of merely empirical contradictions between valid  
norms and social facts, we must affirm all the more the deliberative  
understanding of tolerant norms of equality in order to give marginalized  
individuals a voice and lift the cover that liberal equality continues  





Let me now assess the debate I presented. I believe that Habermas’  
insistence on the voices individuals have within communicatively structured  
public spheres goes a long way towards answering the long- 
standing charge that liberalism is exclusive and intolerant of otherness  
in its consequences. However, the insistence on the democratic legislative  
process, cast in a non-aggregative, deliberative form, also opens up  
further potentials for exclusions and intolerance, even if we grant that  
democratic self-rule requires a prior commitment to equal respect for  
persons.8 I will discuss this potential now by extending some of Menke’s  
arguments. In doing so, I will indirectly draw more explicitly on their  
roots in deconstructive ethics, Adornoian dialectics, and Heideggerian  
hermeneutics; the references will be indirect because Habermas’ concessions  
to these traditions allow us to proceed from within his own work.  
 
If deliberation is to safeguard a place for the perspective of individuals,  
the danger of selective interpretations of central categories (e.g.  
persons) does not only enter the discourses of application of basic (legal)  
norms, but also enter their prior formulation and adoption. As we saw,  
Menke explains the inevitability of particularist interpretations of 
grammatically  
universal categories by two logics: the hermeneutic necessity  
of prejudgments informed by our historical immersion in traditions, and  
the conceptual necessity of determining the content of categories by  
delimiting it from others. These two logics, however, are neither fleshed  
out nor combined by Menke, as is often, and with good justification,  
done in ‘poststructuralist’ political theory.  
 
Habermas’ third response to Menke – the one that insists on the  
deliberative construction of universal concepts – is so powerful because  
it displaces the conceptual construction of ideas of equality and personhood  
from theory to practice, that is, from determinations in advance  
of challenges from individuals to a deliberative political setting in which  
such challenges are always already presumed. In the public sphere,  
abstract definitions and particularist challenges intermingle in the  
construction of neutrality and impartiality. However, in this practical  
political sphere, conceptual and social logics, as well as ‘moral’  
discourses about justice and ‘ethical’ discourses aiming at collective and  
individual self-understanding, may also interpenetrate. At the same  
time, the sphere of democratic practice implies, according to Habermas’  
own understanding, the inevitable institutionalization and, thus, 
particularization of universal norms of equality. In fact, this 
particularization occurs by way of the institutionalization of norms that has 
been rendered inevitable by modernity’s accelerating pluralization, societal  
complexification, and uprooting of traditions – the very processes whose  
implications for normative theory Habermas has perhaps analyzed  
better than any other, and which motivated the turn to a supposedly  
neutral egalitarian universalism in the first place. Hence, I will recommend  
a combination of Menke’s hermeneutic and conceptual arguments,  
focused on the public sphere between normative theory and  
political practice to which Habermas himself points us and thus read  
out of Habermas’ work itself. The combination of these arguments  
upholds the aporetical, open-ended status of egalitarian universalism  
while defending its distinctive promise of best incorporating norms of  
singularity.  
 
Before turning to the hermeneutic argument and its interlocking  
with the requirement of conceptual determination, let us then expand  
the latter – the logic of determination and exclusion – from the sphere  
of logical concepts into the public sphere where deliberation is to safeguard  
a place for norms of singularity. According to Habermas’ Between  
Facts and Norms, universal norms of equality, such as the rational  
norms of deliberation that are to guarantee equal consideration of all,  
constitutively demand their translation into enforceable law (the very  
same point on which Habermas’ second response to Menke relied). In  
modern conditions that witness the absence of a binding world-view  
and an increasingly complex society in which instrumental reason is  
given some room to allocate resources more efficiently, social integration  
requires that enforceable law stabilizes behavioural expectations by  
providing individuals with self-interested motives to comply with moral  
demands. Hence, the discourse principle of norms, according to which  
only those norms are morally obligatory to which all affected could have  
assented in rational deliberation, must be supplemented by what  
Habermas calls the ‘legal form’ (Rechtsform) to yield a principle of  
democratic popular sovereignty (Habermas, 1996: 121). By way of this  
legal form, universal moral norms guaranteeing inclusive and equal  
access to popular sovereignty become institutionalized in an effective  
system of law.9 While universal moral norms of equality regulate interactions  
of communicatively competent subjects in general, legal norms  
affect only members of concrete societies. To be effective, such norms  
must become positive and factical, and that means, historically specific:  
they must name ‘specific rights’ that ‘stem from the decisions of a  
historical legislature’ and ‘demarcate the bounds of membership’  
(Habermas, 1996: 124).  
 
Such factical demarcation, however, can never be fully legitimated  
from the viewpoint of validity, that is, in moral discourse alone. Dismissing  
the ‘fiction of the contractualist tradition’ (Habermas, 1998: 116)  
as inattentive to the historicity of the human condition, Habermas  
writes: ‘One cannot explain in purely normative terms how the universe  
of those who come together to regulate their common life by means of  
positive law should be composed’ (Habermas, 1998: 115). Rather, this  
composition requires the contingency and historicity of political events,  
that is, the ‘boundaries of a political community’ are defined ‘by historical  
chance and the actual course of events – normally, by the arbitrary  
outcomes of wars or civil wars’ (Habermas, 1998: 116). The inevitable  
exclusion of non-members in the course of the factical positivization of  
universal norms constitutes a contingent violence that cannot be justified  
normatively. And further, the institutionalization of norms requires  
the creation of a constitutional state that monopolizes the use of  
violence to change, implement and enforce the law (Habermas, 1996:  
132f.).10 As a result, universal norms of equality are dependent on their  
determination by way of a contingent history, a determinate community  
and a coercive state. Universal normativity remains locked in a state of  
tension with the facticity of histories and institutions of power that  
always threaten to eclipse it. The relation between universal and particular,  
between norm and fact, is one of conflictual dependence: a fragile  
alliance indeed (cf. Markell, 2000).  
 
Already this argument from institutionalization implies the  
inevitability of what we might term external exclusions from the reach  
of universal norms, exclusions which affect democratic states in the  
form of immigration and refugees. However, Habermas’ reference to  
deliberation also results in at least strong tendencies toward internal  
exclusion which affect most visibly, but not exclusively, the formerly  
excluded who have attained formally full membership in democratic  
states (from slaves and the economically underprivileged to women and  
immigrants). If Menke’s logic of determination affecting universal  
norms must be extended, with Habermas, to the political-institutional  
level, the extension may be expected to have consequences for the political  
deliberation that is to best permit the practical intermeshing of  
norms of equality and of singularity. For deliberation brings in the  
question of political affect, and political institutions the issue of motivation  
for compliance and participation. Charles Taylor noted that the  
democratic deliberation Habermas sees as most well designed to successfully  
incorporate individual self-definitions also demands some form of  
cohesion and shared identity on the basis of which a common will can  
be based (Taylor, 1998: 142ff.). In order to coalesce into a sovereign  
entity capable of making collectively binding decisions, deliberation  
requires mutual trust, understanding, a common language, and shared  
affective identifications. Even if we do not, from the beginning, identify  
the unity offering identification with a supposedly pre-political, ethnic,  
or national identity – an identity Habermas admits was necessary in the  
past to consolidate incipient liberal-democratic states, but is no longer  
(Habermas, 1998: 117) – strong exclusionary tendencies result from the  
conceptual requirement to determine such an identity.  
 
This insight is not lost on Habermas, who always recognized the  
need for affective identifications with norms for the purposes of motivation  
and democratic practice. While his strategy of ‘constitutional  
patriotism’ continues to hold out the promise of directly reattaching  
such affects to universal norms themselves, a close reading of his use  
of the concept and his interventions in specific political matters  
uncovers that such identification is always mediated by the institutions  
that we have seen as necessary to particularize universal norms  
(Markell, 2000). What Patchen Markell terms the ‘factical particularization’  
of universal norms (Markell, 2000: 48), then, takes place both  
on the institutional and the affective levels: universal-egalitarian norms  
confront, and even co-constitute and interpellate (in the Althusserian  
sense), individuals as the rights and laws of a specific, bounded  
community with its own contingent history. It comes as no surprise,  
then, that the deliberation informed by constitutional patriotism is  
attached to the shared identifications with particular institutions. And  
it is again this inevitable mediation of the universal by the particular  
embodying it that creates tendencies toward exclusion, which in turn  
require the open-ended confrontation of universal norms of equality  





Let us now turn to Menke’s second, ‘hermeneutic’ argument in his critique  
of Rawls’ and Habermas’ egalitarian universalism. This argument will  
move us from the historicity of institutions, whose particularity is 
indispensable for effective universal norms, including the historicity of 
affective identifications, to the historicity of deliberative discourses. While 
the argument about the uncircumventable institutionalization of universal  
norms already highlighted the ineluctability of a particular, contingent  
history of violence, the argument about the role of affect in deliberative  
settings presents us with an opportunity to recognize the workings of the  
historicity of hermeneutic prejudgments. For the common identity both  
partially established by, and needed for, the project of universalization  
through particular institutions is also one of a more or less common  
framework of interpretation inherited from historical traditions in which  
we find ourselves ‘thrown’ (as Heidegger’s felicitous phrase has it). The  
becoming determinate and particular of universal norms that exist only  
through such becoming also introduces into deliberation along the lines  
of rational discourse a non-chosen frame of reference in which discussion  
takes place, a frame we can partly thematize but never (on rational  
grounds) affirm or dismiss in toto. If you will allow me this extension of  
a well-known Wittgensteinian metaphor: while the (‘transcendentalpragmatic’)  
norms of discourse provide the river banks between which  
the stream of discussion takes place, the shifting horizon is never entirely  
visible for those travelling on the water.12  
 
According to Habermas, deliberative discourses are not only always  
embedded in particular contexts with their customs and traditions, but  
need to be so in order to draw on taken-for-granted background agreements  
for the purpose of establishing consensus. This embeddedness in  
cultural and historical contexts implies that unreflected – and, as  
Habermas says, in toto unthematizable (Habermas, 1987: 124ff.,  
131ff.) – background convictions thwart efforts at a fully transparent,  
fully post-traditional consensus, as they render some claims immune to  
discursive examination. If we take seriously Habermas’ concessions in  
this regard, his dialogical theory of justification, which underwrites the  
moral deliberation he turns against ‘postmodern liberalism’, is not a  
criterial, but a non-foundationalist, contextualist theory (despite the fact  
that Habermas usually reserves the latter term for his ‘relativist’ opponents).  
Justifying a belief or a norm to others – including normatively  
substantial conceptions of personhood, of equality, freedom, and so on  
 
– means the bringing about of rationally motivated agreement. But such  
a rational agreement must rely upon prior agreements that are not  
rationally motivated, but taken for granted in the present context. The  
taken-for-granted beliefs function as regress-stoppers in a chain of  
justification without themselves being foundations in the sense of, for  
example, intuitively self-evident principles. In another context, these  
background beliefs may be thematized, criticized, and defended, but this  
new context will itself rest upon antecedent agreements. Hence, a final  
agreement that rests entirely upon rational, well-justified beliefs is  
impossible to achieve (Heath, 2001: 205): there will always be what  
Habermas calls ‘this remainder of facticity’ (Habermas, 1996: 226)  
regarding our immersion in the historical life-world.  
 
The effect such facticity of embeddedness has on political equality  
and the concept of the person to which it applies, especially if its definition  
and application are made dependent on deliberation, is noted by  
Habermas himself in the exchange with Menke – without, for all that,  
conceding the intrinsic, rather than merely empirical, problems that go  
along with it:  
 
The selective interpretations of norms – which are, according to their 
grammatical form, universal propositions, but which are, on the semantic level,  
by no means immune to particularist interpretations of the fundamental  
concepts employed therein, such as ‘person’ or ‘human being’ – demand  
an empirical explanation. This explanation, however, must extend to the  
semantics of the world view background [des weltanschaulichen Hintergrundes],  
which prejudges the interpretation of norms of equality in favour  
of dominant ideas of value [herrschender Wertvorstellungen]. (Habermas,  
2003: 377)  
 
According to the empirical reading that Habermas employs here, the  
possibility of unexamined prejudgments rendering such interpretations  
particular is always given. While we must make every effort to examine  
the prejudices informing our understanding of persons, we can never  
rule out that we have failed. The procedural constraints of deliberation  
imply universal and context-transcending validity-claims which are, of  
course, always fallible. Their principled fallibility, however, does not, on  
this reading, imply that ‘selective’, particularist interpretations of 
grammatically universal norms are conceptually necessary.  
 
However, as we saw, Habermas himself claims that our communicative  
efforts to reach understanding are always informed by life-world  
backgrounds which can never be exhaustively examined, but which are  
needed to secure rational agreement in deliberation. If we combine this  
hermeneutic insight with the need to determine persons and to delimit  
legal communities, then we are located somewhere between ‘empirical  
possibility’ and ‘conceptual necessity’: on the terrain of undecidability.  
A dialogically achieved consensus on norms of equality and notions of  
personhood will always be secured by antecedent agreements on ‘the  
semantics of the world view background’ – a semantics that provides a  
horizon against which our claims and aspirations gain intelligibility in  
the first place.13 These taken-for-granted beliefs are unreflected but  
necessary for consensus and group-building – in the past, we can think  
of the widely shared assumption that atheists are unfit to stand by  
mutually agreed normative obligations, thereby uniting the warring  
Christian factions; that women and non-European peoples are unable to  
reach the rationality required for democratic participation, thus uniting  
white males, and so on. Surely, we can thematize and criticize these past  
particularisms from the vantage of a historically later standpoint, and  
give an empirical account of how they emerged, but we cannot achieve  
universals, understood as dialogically justified norms of equality, without  
any such uniting backgrounds. As a result of this ‘contextualism’, an  
entirely transparent universal consensus, in which the universality of  
norms is brought to reflective awareness, is unattainable.  
 
So Habermas is right to claim for moral discourses that we cannot  
be sure future interpretations of ‘person’ will be exclusionary, but this  
does not yet mean that all exclusions are merely empirical: as we saw, in  
the public sphere of legally bounded communities, exclusions follow an  
inescapable logic of determination that particularizes grammatically  
universal norms in specific institutions and histories. These in turn  
develop strong tendencies toward exclusion, and render decisions as to  
the non-exclusionary status cognitively undecidable. Not only can  
exclusions never be ruled out with certainty, but they are even very likely,  
and require us to take non-empirical reasons for their occurrence into  
account. Whether we wish to call this result ‘paradoxical’ (or ‘postmodern’  
or ‘reason-critical’) may be beside the point (and betray a  
perhaps outdated inclination to divide up the world into moderns and  
postmoderns, what Foucault famously called ‘Enlightenment blackmail’).  
 
That exclusionary injustice often depends on collective frames of  
interpretation which render the moral status of current norms and  
associated concepts of personhood cognitively undecidable indicates,  
however, that resistance to injustice not so much follows from an ideal  
toward which we are progressively marching, but rather proceeds  
according to the logic of determinate negation: in the past, the unequal  
treatment of women, homosexuals, and others, relied on the inequality  
that is justified when it comes to small children or to cases of severe  
mental handicaps. Collective learning processes, as Albrecht Wellmer  
has argued on the basis of similar considerations, consist not so much  
in the application of an ideal state to current practices of exclusion, but  
in the gradual recognition that such justification does not really hold  
for women, homosexuals, and others. The notion of progress toward  
an ideal which Habermas defends in his first response to Menke, then,  
fails to consider that the ideal might be unanticipatable or unthinkable.  
Progress, in Wellmer’s words, might rather consist in the ‘elimination of  






So far we have considered two of the three arguments that seek to establish  
the inherently aporetic nature of egalitarian universalism: the  
hermeneutic argument from historicity and the logic of determination.  
Let me now turn to the third agument, to wit, the claim that equal  
consideration internally requires a different project, one centered on  
understanding others from their own point of view without merely  
seeking to abstract from differences. As indicated, Menke believes that  
the latter project, while indispensable to equal treatment, both re- 
grounds and exceeds the egalitarian framework:  
 
According to its own sense, an interminable, always to be enacted re-examination  
of the existing practices of equality already belongs to the egalitarian  
reflection. . . . As we have seen, however, we can enact this  
examination only if we, at the same time, repeat the formation process of  
our respective ‘abstract’ concept of persons. For this reason, we are inexorably  
involved in a different project in the revision of our practice of  
equality: in the understanding of individuals in their concreteness and  
difference. . . . But the understanding of individuals is not enacted from the  
normative perspective of equality. (Menke, 2000: 22f.)  
 
What I now wish to indicate is, first, that the tension between a  
universal-egalitarian and a particularist approach to others in their very  
difference does not disappear once both are, with Habermas, transferred  
to a discursive, deliberative framework. Second, I wish to argue in the  
next and last section that it is the combination of the first two arguments,  
which we saw leading to exclusions, that provide the third  
argument with additional, perhaps its most salient, significance. To  
approach the first of these two argumentative sketches, let us look a bit  
more closely at Menke’s redescription of the egalitarian project.  
 
Menke conceives of the egalitarian reflection, as we have seen, as  
requiring both the description of ‘persons’ who are to be treated as  
equal, and the understanding of individuals in their own terms. Apart  
from the difference in content between these two practices, the crucial  
divergence consists in the perspective from which they are undertaken:  
while conceiving persons occurs from the perspective of all, understanding  
individuals and their plans of life proceeds from their own perspective.  
The former describes individuals in view of more abstract  
determinations they are presumed to share with all, while the latter  
suspends abstraction in the effort to enter their own hermeneutic self- 
relation, including the weight they attach to different elements of their  
lives. In short, ‘a person is determined from the perspective of his or her  
equality with all others, whereas an individual is determined from his  
or her own perspective upon him- or herself’ (Menke, 2000: 26).  
 
Reasons for needing both perspectives reveal the interdependence of  
norms of equality and of singularity: the insufficiency of each taken by  
itself releases a call for its transcendence toward the other. Equality  
demands the determination of equal persons, which in turn must be able  
to absorb the shifting self-descriptions of individuals. The equally  
significant demand to do justice to individuals, however, must realize  
the ultimate arbitrariness of singling out some (e.g. co-nationals) at the  
expense of others, and thus calls for universally equal treatment (Menke,  
2000: 83; cf. Derrida, 1990: 949; Derrida, 1999b: 33).15 In this sense,  
the two projects – doing justice to individuals and to all equals – depend  
on, and yet interrupt and limit, one another. This is why, for conceptual  
reasons, the egalitarian project of morality and law cannot be  
referred to a utopian horizon or a regulative idea without addressing  
the necessity of interrupting the progress toward the ideal (Menke,  
2000: 85; cf. Derrida, 1990: 965ff.; Bennington, 2000: 192f.).16  
 
As indicated, it is plausible that the open and inclusive forms of  
communication Habermas advocates can absorb both the description of  
persons and the understanding of individuals. Especially the communicative  
processes in what Habermas describes as an ‘anarchic’ public  
sphere of free-floating opinion-formation without pressure to come to a  
binding agreement, can, and indeed must, accomplish both. This does  
not yet imply, however, that the two processes do not remain distinct:  
communication is such a wide term that it may be able to accommodate  
the understanding of individuals on their own terms and the formulation  
of equal persons as well as the justification of norms which apply to them  
equally. In the deliberation which Habermas recommends, all affected  
are to have equal chances of initiating discourses, setting the agenda,  
voicing concerns, and all such voices are to count equally. In addition,  
the cognitive demand for good reasons forces merely self-involved or self- 
interested participants to seek reasons which could convince all, thereby  
demanding that they take the perspective of all involved (cf. Benhabib,  
1996: 71f.). Habermas rightly insists further that, against his understanding  
of Rawls’ political liberalism, such perspective-taking requires that  
actual processes of communication be carried out (Habermas, 1990: 66f.;  
Habermas, 1998: 49ff.).17 Hence, communicative practices in civil  
society should, ideally, be able to justify norms of equality and determine  
personhood by taking into account individual self-descriptions, as  
communicated by those individuals themselves. In this sense, Habermas  
writes: ‘The impartiality of judgment is expressed in a principle that  
constrains all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the  
balancing of interests’ (Habermas, 1990: 65; original emphases).  
 
The phrase, however, is ambiguous in our context: I may take the  
perspective of all others in the distributive sense of the perspective of  
each individual or the collective sense of the perspective of the common  
good. In the latter case, I take the perspective of the other only so as to  
determine what interests he or she shares with me; it would thus correspond  
to Habermas’ insistence that norms be justified on the basis of  
universalizable interests.18 Alternatively, the discourse principle of  
justification constrains all participants to take the perspective of each  
and every person concerned from her or his own, singular point of view,  
in order to assess whether they could agree to proposed norms. That  
the latter is, for Habermas, an indispensable aspect of universalization  
is clear from another formulation of the universalization principle:  
 
(U) A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of  
its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each  
individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.  
(Habermas, 1998: 42; original emphases)  
 
The principle thus requires that all affected apprehend an institutionalized  
or widely followed norm’s ‘consequences and side effects’ for  
all singular others and their value-orientations and interests. This  
suggests that all concerned adopt the perspective of each individual from  
his or her own point of view, in order to see what consequences a norm,  
and its understanding of personhood, has for a person’s way of life and  
self-understanding – the same line of reasoning that led Habermas to  
call for ideal role-taking in the ambiguous passage cited above. Thus,  
the universalization principle governing the democratic discourses that  
are to include the voices of individuals wavers between what Seyla  
Benhabib called the generalized and the concrete other (Benhabib,  
1986), and corresponds to Menke’s account of the perspective of all and  
the perspective of the singular other.  
 
This brief consideration of Habermas’ principle governing the equal  
consideration of all, then, not only shows that deliberative and democratic  
discussion, being such an inclusive term, may include both the  
description of persons and the understanding of individuals. Rather, the  
very formulation of the universalization principle suggests the necessity  
of at least including within equal treatment norms of singularity, if not,  
more aporetically, transcending the former practice toward the latter.  
Hence, Habermas’ reference to deliberation in the debate with Menke  
not so much resolves the ‘paradox’ of equality but rather confirms it:  
according to its very sense, equal treatment demands that the perspective  
of singular others be assumed from their own points of view. One  
might here claim on behalf of Habermas that the ambiguity does not  
yet show a paradoxical duality at the heart of equality, for deliberative  
communication could once more accomplish both types of perspective- 
taking without intrinsic conflict. However, the very fact that Habermas  
seeks to cast both perspectives into different types of hierarchically  
related discourses appears to indicate his recognition that the inclusion  
of the singularizing perspective in universally equal treatment renders it  
aporetically self-reflected or ‘mirrored’ in Menke’s sense. It is in his  
response to Benhabib and others that Habermas sought to resolve the  
ambiguity or duality of the universalization principle by distinguishing  
between discourses of justification focused on understanding all equally  
from the viewpoint of what is equally good for all, and subordinate  
(nachgeordnete) discourses of application, in which the viewpoint of the  
singular other must be taken (Habermas, 2005: 317ff.). I have argued  
elsewhere that this strategy of recompartmentalization fails due to the  
kind of reasons Menke mentions as well as the more general problems  
affecting the distinction between justification and application.19 This  
strategy, then, fails largely because avoiding conflict between the universalist  
and the singularizing approaches also avoids their interdependence,  
and therewith the possibility of individual self-understandings  
making their way into justified norms and challenging dominant  




Thus, we have to adopt the perspective of others not only from the viewpoint  
of all, but from the viewpoint of each individual. As indicated, it  
is especially significant to adopt the perspective of those who have been  
excluded in the past. This brings me to my last point: since the  
becoming-enforceable of egalitarian norms requires their supplementation  
by a particularity that brings with it strong tendencies toward  
exclusion, Menke’s insistence on egalitarian universalism’s need for a  
different, singular project of understanding individuals becomes all the  
more plausible, even urgent. If we take into account the inevitable 
institutionalization of abstract procedures of moral deliberation, the resulting  
external exclusions of non-members and strong tendencies toward  
internal exclusion add a number of complications to the insistence on  
communicative conflict resolution.  
 
To begin with external exclusions, we saw that Habermas not only  
sees them as facts of empirical history, but finds it difficult to envision  
their absence, given the need for political determination and the well- 
rehearsed arguments against a world state. Thus, the moral requirement  
of involving all affected by norms and their consequences conflicts with  
the legal-political requirement of restricting deliberation to members of  
bounded democratic communities. As has been observed frequently, this  
conflict calls for resolution in the context of globalization processes in  
which many western democracies, including the European Union,  
restrict access to markets and to citizenship for political and economic  
refugees and would-be immigrants, while at the same time liberalizing  
financial markets and capital flows to increase the number of those  
affected by the neo-liberal economic policies of those same countries.  
Witness also the increasing interest of an emerging global civil society  
in, especially, US elections, due to the clearly perceived stake non-US  
citizens have in the outcome. Here, we would need from Habermas  
clarification of the relation between moral and legal-political fora, as  
well as models of global democracy that extend the reach of deliberative  
inclusiveness. Habermas is on the right track when he claims that  
the globalization of democracy has to catch up with economic globalization  
once we no longer have markets within nation-states, but nation- 
states in a global market (Habermas, 1999). It is clear, however, that a  
conflict will remain between the moral demand to include all those  
affected, and the political requirement to distinguish between members  
and non-members, a distinction, we saw, that is required for the enforceability  
of egalitarian-universal norms.  
 
Regarding the often less perceptible exclusions internal to democratic  
states, we should begin by noting that taking the perspective of  
others, especially in the distributive sense, is not merely ‘mutual’, as  
Habermas routinely and without further ado has it, when communication  
and understanding are envisioned as taking place between  
unequal partners, and against a frame of reference that shores up a  
dominant identity. The frame in question typically includes a habitual,  
‘normalized’ conceptualization of, first, the notion of personhood that  
underwrites institutionalized practices of equality; second, the agents  
expected to take part in public deliberation; and, third, the mode of  
communicative engagements in the public sphere. For example, western  
democracies still expect ‘person’ to refer primarily to heterosexual 
individuals, often heterosexual (and married) men; the public deliberator is  
usually expected to be reasoned, calm, dispassionate, and articulate; and  
deliberation is to be competitive but orderly, logical, and non-rhetorical  
(cf. Young, 1996; Young, 2000: 36f.). In addition, the frame often  
makes ‘ideological’ assumptions that, while potentially exclusionary or  
harmful to certain groups, are difficult to thematize because of their  
deep sedimentation in traditions and world-views (such as the assumption  
that work is good in itself, that productivity growth is an unquestionable  
good, and that women are more emotional than men). To  
absorb the project of understanding individuals, we must avoid conceptions  
of deliberation that deny the influence of frames of reference and  
emphasize the role that norms of singularity play in it.  
 
And further, the dual accomplishment of communicative action –  
conceiving and justifying universal-egalitarian norms while doing justice  
to individuals and their self-descriptions – requires that the model of  
deliberation be aware of tendencies to exclusion that inhabit communication  
itself and that mutual perspective-taking between equals not be  
taken for granted. In situations of exclusions, the dominance of a certain  
identity and its frame of interpretation often goes unnoticed by the  
members of that community, though not by the excluded. The latter  
have often less trouble in taking the perspective of the dominant identity,  
so that equality in the process of exchanging perspectives should be a  
normative goal, but may not be assumed and encounters practical  
obstacles. Hence, it requires an extra effort on the part of members of  
privileged groups to do justice to individuals and their differences. The  
moral call to understand individuals on their own terms must be  
addressed to them above all. At the same time, and this time looked at  
from the perspective of marginalized voices, these voices might have to  
resort to practices that appear non-deliberative or merely disruptive to  
the center in order to call attention to the exclusionary processes. For  
instance, art and social activism, expressed in noisy and angry protests,  
may play important roles here (Young, 2001). This is so especially if,  
as is the case in deliberative publics that depend on privately owned  
media outlets, some dominant perspectives are supported by non- 
communicative interests and systemic, functional imperatives which  
routinely exclude undesirable perspectives (see Herman and Chomsky,  
2002). Activist and artistic challenges to dominant frames may then not  
be dismissed easily, as is routinely the case in corporate media, as 
unreasonable, undeliberative, and particularistic.  
 
This need for a different form of engagement not subsumable under  
rational discussion becomes of particular importance in relations of  
often unacknowledged differential status with regard to culture, class,  
power, and gender. In order to encourage the assumption of excluded  
or marginalized points of view – that is, the understanding of excluded  
individuals as opposed to the construction of generalizable norms and  
concepts of person – communication must first loosen affective identifications  
with particular institutions that mediate universal norms. Only  
then can communication seek to encourage the understanding of individuals.  
This might require less rationalistic, more affective modes of  
engagement, such as narratives. Here, it is important to emphasize less  
the justificatory, rational processes of public deliberation, and more the  
often unilateral, asymmetric adoption of perspectives that is irreducible  
to the process of coming to an agreement. In addition, in situations of  
exclusion in particular, understanding others is often more important  
than, and a prior requirement of, justifying norms and concepts of  
personhood acceptable to all.  
 
Thus, the key concepts of equality and personhood must remain  
essentially contested and open-ended. Due to its ‘internal heterogeneity’,  
the logic of equality requires its constant interrogation from the  
perspective of singular individuals. Obviously, such a perspective has to  
prevent nihilistic conclusions: a ‘disarming ontologization’ (Habermas,  
2003: 381) of particularist readings of universal categories may not undermine 
efforts to redefine it. But unless we wish to resuscitate the doctrine of 
politically necessary illusions, we have to face up to a democracy as well as a 
justice that remain to come.  
 





Josh Cohen would add that deliberative democracy, precisely by including  
such intersubjective revision, also allows for more individual autonomy.  
See Cohen (1988); Weinstock (2001).  
 
2  
Menke does not elaborate on this point. However, for a similar argument,  
 
see Geuss (1999).  
 
3  
All translations from Menke as well as from Habermas (2003) are my own.  
 
4  
As becomes apparent here, in order to allow what I am calling a norm of  
singularity (doing justice to individuals on their own terms) to play this  
indispensable role in egalitarian universalism, Menke severs the norm from  
the motivational and affective ties that are usually associated with relations  
such as care, love, and friendship (Menke, 2000: 43f.). In addition, he does  
not agree with Levinas and Derrida that doing justice to individuals  
requires the complete absorption in their perspective, so as to speak their  
language; rather, understanding individuals, he claims, is sufficient (Menke,  
2000: 84ff.). This perspective is consistent with Iris Marion Young’s  
insistence on the dangers of mutual perspective-taking as opposed to merely  




Following Menke and Habermas, I leave aside for the moment the issue of  
excluding clearly illiberal, anti-egalitarian conceptions of the good life.  
 
6  
Habermas responds mostly to Menke’s critique of Rawls (Menke, 2002),  
with only sporadic references to Menke’s book-length treatment of egalitarian  
universalism (Menke, 2000; see also the revised version: Menke,  
2004). Taking the latter term to cover both his own theory and also Rawls’,  
Habermas defends Rawls, but from the viewpoint of his own theory of  
deliberative democracy. This strategy might seem surprising, given that, as  
we will see, Habermas largely criticizes what he calls ‘postmodern liberalism’  
for its neglect of the internal relation between democracy and liberalism,  
more or less the same charge he levelled at Rawls (Habermas, 1998:  
50f., 67ff.). We can only speculate whether this strategy implies a 
reconsideration  
of the critique of Rawls, or a joining of forces in the face of a  
perceived common foe.  
 
7  
Primary defenders of the ethics of care agree that it must be restricted to  
the private realm: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological  
Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press, 1982); Virginia Held, Feminist Morality (Chicago, IL: University of  
Chicago Press, 1993); Marilyn Friedman, What are Friends For? (Ithaca,  
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 87–8; Nel Noddings, Caring, a  
Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University  
of California Press, 1984). See, however, Michael Slote, ‘Justice and  
Caring’, Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (1998): 171–95. See also his  
Morals From Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 92–113,  
and Scott D. Gelfand, ‘The Ethics of Care and (Capital?) Punishment’, Law  
and Philosophy 23(6) (November 2004): 593–614.  
 
8  
See Charles Larmore’s critique of Habermas (Larmore, 1999). Menke makes  
the more general point that, not only can equal respect not be derived from  
a conception of autonomy, as Habermas’ discourse rule (D) implies, but  
equality cannot ground itself without presupposing itself (Menke, 2000: 8f.).  
 
9  
In his treatment of the relation between law and justice, Derrida simply  
assumes, with Pascal, the necessity of translating justice into enforceable  
law, without giving the functional justification Habermas provides (Derrida,  
1990: 937).  
 
10  
Both the founding of such a state and its monopoly cannot be fully justified,  
as Derrida and Benjamin have argued (Derrida, 1992; Benjamin, 1979; see  
also Fritsch, 2005: 107ff.). From the insight into the factical 
particularization of universal norms and the resulting status between facts and 
norms, Habermas comes close to drawing the same conclusion as did Derrida: the  
justification of exclusionary boundaries and the monopolization of violence  
remain deferred to a non-present future that involves us in a forever incomplete  
project of universalization: ‘Every earthly monopoly on violence, even  
that of a world government, has finite dimensions, which remain provincial  
in comparison with the future and the universe’ (Habermas, 1996: 124).  
 
11  
I leave the question open whether the logic of conceptual determination on  
which Menke draws may be extended to a social ontology that takes the  
(cultural, and at times, as in the case of Laclau and Mouffe, socioeconomic)  
struggle for recognition to include a logic of identity and difference.  
According to this logic of inclusion and exclusion, an identity can  
establish itself only in relation to others (omnis determinatio est negatio,  
as Hegel had Spinoza say), with the result that every identity is both 
internally differentiated and requires an other whose exclusion it must 
perpetuate and re-negotiate (see Connolly, 1991: 64ff.; Mouffe, 2000). If the  
conceptual logic of inclusion and exclusion could be transferred to social  
and political ontology, what Charles Taylor has diagnosed as (strong but  
mere) tendencies toward exclusions that precisely stem from the deliberative  
requirement of cohesion and knowing and trusting one another (Taylor,  
1998), may be seen as conceptually inevitable. The argument would be that  
a collectivity inherently requires, especially for the sake of democratic  
struggles and their motivation, the existence of some other in contrast to  
which it can define itself. While Mouffe makes this claim on the basis of  
Carl Schmitt and Derrida’s logic of the ‘constitutive outside’, Derrida  
himself rejects the Schmittian logic of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as being too sure as  
to who the ‘enemy’ and who the ‘friend’ is (Derrida, 1999a: 114ff.).  
Derrida appears to favour a non-antagonistic reading of the logic of  
identity and difference that does not yet commit us to an adversarial 
understanding of the relation between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ – it could be some  
combination of admiration, friendship, competition, resentment, hostility,  
etc. The Derridian argument also does not yet dispute the possibility of  
universally human solidarity, as the other may be internal to the human,  
or non-human. See Abizadeh (2005).  
 
12  
Such an inherited frame of reference, while necessary in general to motivate  
action and agreement, may nonetheless be ‘oppressive’ (arguably, a Puritan- 
derived work ethic would be a case in point). See Iris Marion Young’s  
concern about the ways in which an ideological frame of reference structures  
deliberation and precipitates agreement even against the (strategic and  
moral) interest of the oppressed. Young’s claim that, in conditions of  
unequal power relations, such frames are best disrupted not by deliberation  
itself but by political activism, deserves to be taken seriously (Young,  
2001). Political activism would here serve a role that art played for most  
members of the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School, Adorno in  
particular: that of disrupting well-oiled frames of reference that serve the  
powers that be.  
 
13  
For Heidegger and Gadamer, of course, the very unreflectedness of the  
background is a necessary condition for the possibility of what is thematized  
coming to light: disclosure requires withdrawal in the same sense in  
which a foreground cannot be thought without a background. With  
primary reference to Gadamer, see Odenstedt (2003).  
 
14  
As I have argued elsewhere, that Habermas tends to neglect his own concession  
to the phenomenological account of the life-world and the hermeneutic  
conception of historicity may be explained by the fact that his  
transcendental inquiry into the enabling conditions of communicative  
action in general and argumentative discourse in particular – conditions  
which would have to include the life-world background as well as, perhaps  
more controversially, embodiment in a sense to be specified – relies  
on the logic of performative contradictions to identify such conditions  
(Fritsch, ‘Practical Reason Reconstructed and Deconstructed. A Reading of  
Habermas’, MS; see also Connolly, 1999: 10, 38, 41). As a result,  
conditions that, already at a conceptual level, lie in conflict with one  
another, such as those of rational decidability and historicity, are screened  
out from the beginning.  
 
15  
Largely for this reason, Adorno, Levinas and Menke claim, the ethical  
impulse to solidarity with the unique other is, in fact, the origin of the  
moral law of equality (cf. Menke, 2000: 84).  
 
16  
This is why Habermas is wrong to attribute to Derrida an ‘undefined  
messianic hope’ that could be described in positive terms, for example, as  
the ‘outstanding, expanded, and domination-free understanding of liberal  
equality’ (Habermas, 2003: 371). This attribution misses the difference  
between what Derrida calls ‘messianism’ (which projects such outstanding  
horizons of expectation) and ‘messianicity’ (which names the contradictory  
status of such horizons). See Derrida (1994: 167ff.). Thus, Habermas  
misreads Derrida when he claims that Menke’s (and Laclau’s) ‘anti-utopian’  
(Habermas’) conclusion is not shared by Derrida. Elsewhere, I have argued  




In their debate, Rawls in essence responds by claiming that such actual  
processes of communication, while not situated at the level of the original  
position, are nonetheless demanded at the prior level of reflective equilibrium,  
which first agrees on the procedure of the original position (Rawls,  
1996: 382ff.).  
 
18  
Even this understanding is ambiguous: an interest may be collectively or  
distributively universal, in the sense that it either indicates that parties 
hold a single interest in common (e.g. the avoidance of global environmental  
catastrophe), or that each party has its own interest (e.g. in avoiding pain),  
which happen to overlap. See Finlayson (2000).  
 
19  
See ‘Equality and Singularity in Justification and Application Discourses’,  
MS. There, I argue that Habermas’ strategy of confining the perspective- 
taking of each singular individual (gen. obj. and gen. subj.) to application  
discourses, while restricting to justification discourses the perspective of  
what is equally good for all, fails to consider that the former is already  
needed at the level of justification. For the more general problems affecting  
the justification–application distinction, see Wellmer (1986) and also Arash  
Abizadeh, ‘Pragmatic, not Metaethical: a Critique of the Habermas/Günther  
“Justification vs. Application” Distinction’, paper presented at the 12th  
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